Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
| Authors | Robert Dur, Arjan Non, Hein Roelfsema |
|---|---|
| Published in | Journal of Economic Psychology |
| Publication date | 2010 |
| Type | Article |
Summary
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker’s effort nor manager’s attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.
| Language | Engels |
|---|---|
| Published in | Journal of Economic Psychology |
| Year and volume | 31 4 |
| Page range | 676-686 |
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